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Abstract.   The first part of this paper presents a simple labor supply and production model 
wherein farmers with diminishing marginal utility of income derive nonpecuniary benefits from 
farming.  We use the model to show how lump-sum or “decoupled” government payments could 
have positive and substantial effects on the supply of agricultural products.  The result is simple 
and intuitive:  payments allow those who enjoy farming to continue farming while maintaining a 
reasonably high living standard.  Without payments, a lower living standard leads to higher 
marginal utility of income, making higher off-farm wages more desirable than lower on-farm 
wages plus non-pecuniary benefits from farming.  Farmers respond to a reduction in payments 
by shifting their labor off-farm or exiting farming.  This effect on labor supply and production is 
potentially much larger than effects predicted by earlier theoretical models that rely on utility 
with  declining  absolute  risk  aversion.  The  second  part  of  this  paper  estimates  the  hourly 
nonpecuniary benefits to farming, for farms where the operator or spouse works off-farm, by 
comparing  returns  to  household  labor  on-farm  and  off-farm.    Results  indicate  substantial 
nonpecuniary  benefits  to  farming.    The  empirical  findings  support  a  necessary  (though  not 
sufficient) condition for lump-sum payments having a substantial influence on production via an 
income effect.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Agricultural  policy  reforms,  beginning  in  the  U.S.  with  the  1996  Federal  Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, have attempted to minimize production distortions by 
giving farmers lump-sum payments that are not tied to production decisions or prices.  How 
these  “decoupled”  payments  affect  production  is  an  important  question  in  the  context  of 
international trade because farm payments can be considered as “green box” – that is, exempt 
from  World  Trade  Organization  limits  –  if,  among  other  things,  they  have  “no,  or  at  most 
minimal,  trade  distorting  effects  on  production”  (WTO,  1999).      Theoretical  or  empirical 
evidence concerning how decoupled payments influence production could play an important role 
in future trade negotiations and disputes. 
Within the academic literature, a great deal of uncertainty remains about how lump-sum 
payments influence production.  With complete and perfect markets, economic theory suggests 
that  lump-sum  payments  have  no  effect  on  production.    However,  when  there  are  market 
imperfections  –  such  as  incomplete  labor  markets,  transactions  costs,  or  credit  constraints – 
lump-sum payments might influence production (e.g., Roe, Somwaru, and Diao, 2003).  Chau 
and de Gorter (2001) suggest that payments might increase the number of producers who are 
able to meet their fixed costs and therefore remain in production.  They argue that even though 
lump-sum payments may not affect firm-level output decisions, the payments could influence 
aggregate output by altering incentives to exit the industry. 
Hennessy (1998) provided a widely cited rationale for production distortions from lump-
sum  payments  that  has  served  as  the  basis  for  several  policy  simulations  (e.g.,  Young  and 
Westcott, 2000; Mullen, de Gorter, and Gloy, 2001).  He showed that with declining absolute 
risk aversion (DARA), lump-sum payments raise income and therefore reduce risk aversion, 
resulting in greater output.  Studies finding an income effect on crop allocation decisions have 
been interpreted as evidence of DARA preferences (Chavas and Holt, 1990).  However, DARA 
preferences alone are unlikely to result in a large income effect because the magnitude of this   2 
effect depends on the third derivative of the utility function – i.e., how the concavity (the second 
derivative) of the utility function changes with a change in income (Just, 2006).
1   
In this paper, we propose a new way lump-sum payments could have a substantial effect 
on  production  via  an  income  effect.
2    The  income  effect  we  describe  does  not  stem  from 
uncertainty  or  standard  market  failures  but  instead  results  when  farm  operators  derive 
nonpecuniary benefits from farming – that is, when operators prefer on-farm work to off-farm 
work, given the same wage.  The intuition is as follows: at low payment levels, farmers cannot 
“afford” to work more on-farm – they must work off-farm at a higher wage to earn enough to 
satisfy their basic needs. As payments increase they can increasingly “afford” to consume the 
nonpecuniary benefits that come with working on-farm. Hence, they work more on-farm, and 
output increases. 
The model developed in the next two sections formalizes this intuition.  It shows that 
farmers allocate their labor to equate marginal utility from labor (labor provides income and 
nonpecuniary  benefits)  in  on-farm  and  off-farm  work.    Higher  lump-sum  payments  (which 
farmers receive regardless of their labor allocation) lower the marginal utility of income but do 
not reduce the marginal utility of nonpecuniary benefits.  Farmers respond by shifting labor from 
off-farm to on-farm, which raises the marginal utility of income and lowers the marginal utility 
of nonpecuniary benefits, restoring equilibrium.  Since output is increasing in labor, an increase 
in lump-sum payments results in greater production. 
There  exists  some  empirical  support  for  positive  nonpecuniary  benefits  to  farming.  
Summary statistics for farm income have, for many years, shown that a substantial portion of 
farmers report negative returns from farming (e.g., Hoppe and Banker, 2006).  The fact that 
farmers appear to earn less on-farm than they could earn in an alternative off-farm occupation is 
                                                            
1 Using a calibration similar to Rabin (2000), Just (2006) shows that for a lump-sum payment equal to 50 percent of 
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consistent with nonpecuniary benefits to farming.  The limited research that exists on this topic 
suggests  that  attributes  associated  with  farming  –  such  as  autonomy  over  farm  management 
decisions, independence, sense of responsibility, and pride associated with business ownership – 
are valuable to hog farmers (Gillespie and Eidman, 1998; Gillespie, Davis, and Rahelizatovo, 
2004). Outside of agriculture, studies have compared the well-being of the self-employed to paid 
employees and generally found that the self-employed express greater satisfaction with their jobs 
(Eden,  1973;  Katz,  1993;  Vandenheuvel  and  Wooden,  1997).    One  influential  study  found 
substantial non-monetary benefits to self-employment:  individuals were willing to give up about 
35  percent  of  their  income  in  order  to  be  self-employed  rather  than  to  be  paid  employees 
(Hamilton, 2000).  
In the second part of this paper, we estimate the nonpecuniary benefits from farming 
using  data  from  three  annual  nationally-representative  surveys  of  farm  households.    Past 
empirical studies compared returns to non-farm labor for separate samples of self-employed or 
paid  workers  (Brock  and  Evans,  1986;  Rees  and  Shah,  1986,  Borjas  and  Bronars,  1989; 
Hamilton, 2000).  Here we compare returns to labor for on-farm and off-farm work for the same 
households,  which  controls  for  all  individual  effects  –  both  observable  effects  (such  as 
differences in education, experience, or location) and unobservable effects (such as motivation, 
entrepreneurial ability, or intelligence).  This provides a compelling estimate of the nonpecuniary 
benefits to farming for those farm households with members who work off-farm.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the basic theoretical 
model  illustrating  how  decoupled  payments  can  stimulate  supply  when  farmers  receive 
nonpecuniary benefits from farming. The third section provides a graphical illustration of the 
model and a simple numerical simulation showing how decoupled payments could substantially 
affect  production.  The  fourth  section  reviews  the  literature  associated  with  estimating 
nonpecuniary benefits and proposes an empirical model for estimating the nonpecuniary benefits 
to farming. Sections five and six discuss the data used for the estimations and the results. The 
final section concludes.   4 
2. Theoretical Model 
 
There is an established literature considering the allocation of farm household labor (e.g., Lee, 
1965; Gronau, 1977; Sumner, 1982; Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). In the basic model, farm 
households choose between leisure and labor on and off-farm to maximize utility – workers are 
indifferent between working on and off-farm at the same wage rate. In this context, “coupled” 
payments (payments tied in some way to agricultural output) would be expected to raise the 
returns to farm labor relative to off-farm labor resulting in a shift in labor on-farm. The stimulus 
effect of an increase in government payments would be counterbalanced to some degree by an 
increase in the consumption of leisure made possible by the higher  farm wage rate.   In the 
standard model, “decoupled” (lump-sum) payments affect labor allocation through the labor-
leisure  trade-off:  higher  income  results  in  an  increase  in  the  consumption  of  leisure, with  a 
commensurate reduction in farm and off-farm labor, and consequently a reduction in output.  To 
make a clear distinction with earlier work, to increase the simplicity of the model, and because 
we expect the income elasticity of labor supply to be approximately zero over the range of 
payments considered, we do not incorporate leisure into our model.
3  
Consider a unitary farm household that allocates its endowment of labor (L) between on-
farm l and off-farm  (L  – l) activities to maximize utility from income  y and from the non-
pecuniary benefits from farming relative to working off-farm b: 
 
(1)      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) l b g l y u g l U
l
, , ; max = . 
 
                                                            
3 Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) estimate the effect of unearned income on labor supply using evidence 
derived from a survey of lottery players.  They found lottery winnings of $15,000 per year for twenty years had little 
or no effect on labor supply. For winnings of $80,000 per year for twenty years, they found unearned income had a 
small effect on labor earnings, with a marginal propensity to consume leisure of approximately 11 percent.  The 
marginal propensity to consume leisure from earned income would logically be even less than for unearned income.   5 
Assume positive and diminishing marginal utility of income (uy > 0; uyy < 0, where subscripts 
denote partial derivatives) and positive non-pecuniary benefits from farming (ub > 0).  Income 
depends on labor supplied on-farm and government payments g: 
 
(2)      ( ) ( ) g l L w l pq g l y + - + = ) ( , , 
 
where q is output,  0 > l q , and w is the off-farm wage.  Nonpecuniary benefits from farming are 
positive if l > 0 and are increasing in on-farm labor ( 0 > l b ).  Government payments are lump-
sum in that g is fixed—it does not depend on the farmer’s labor allocation, agricultural output, or 
any other decision or outcome. 
First consider the case where labor is allocated to both on-farm and off-farm activities 
(there is an interior solution).  In this case, the first order condition for a maximum is 
 
(3)      ( ) 0 = + - = l b l y l b u w pq u U . 
 
Totally differentiating (3) gives:  0 = + dg U dl U lg ll  or 
 
(4)      ll lg U U dg dl - = . 
 
From the second order condition for a maximum,  0 < ll U , so (4) will be positive if  
 




(6)      ( ) l l yy yb b w pq u u - - > . 
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Since, from the FOC (3):  
 
(7)      0 < - = - y l b l u b u w pq , 
 
the right-hand side of (6) is negative. Hence, (4) is positive if  0 ³ yb u , and may be positive even 
if  0 < yb u .  If utility is additively or multiplicatively separable (e.g., Cobb-Douglass), the cross-
partial would be zero or positive, and (6) will always be true. More generally, we must assume 
the non-pecuniary benefits from farm labor is not a strongly inferior good. 
  While the above analysis considers only interior solutions, corner solutions (l = 0 or l = 
L)  do  not  change  the  basic  results.    Under  given  assumptions,  the  first-order  condition  is 
monotonic, so if on-farm labor begins at l = 0, an increase in g may leave labor allocation 
unchanged or increase it, and if on-farm labor begins at l = L, an increase in g necessarily 
implies labor will remain at l = L.  Thus, on-farm labor supply is weakly increasing in g.  In sum, 
unless the nonpecuniary benefits to farming are a strongly inferior good, an increase in lump-
sum payments will result in an increase in on-farm labor supply, and therefore an increase in 
output. 
 
3. A Graphical Illustration and Numerical Simulation 
 
The effect of lump-sum payments on the household labor allocation decision is illustrated in 
figure 1.  In the model, a farmer can allocate labor to both on-farm and off-farm work.  For 
clarity, we illustrate graphically only the choice between working full time on-farm and full time 
off-farm.  The figure shows an individual’s utility working either on-farm or off-farm, both with 
and without a lump-sum payment g.  Income from full-time off-farm employment is Lw, equal to 
total labor allocation L multiplied by the off-farm wage w.   Income from full-time on-farm 
employment  is  Lw
f,  where  w
f  is  the  implicit  on-farm  wage.  The  lower  utility  line  shows 
diminishing marginal utility of income without non-pecuniary benefits of farm labor.  The higher   7 
utility line shows additional utility from farm labor relative to non-farm labor (non-pecuniary 
benefits).  Without the lump-sum transfer (g), utility is higher when working full-time off-farm 
compared to working full time on-farm, u(Lw, b(0)) > u(Lw
f, b(L)).  With a lump transfer, utility 
is higher for working full time on-farm, u(Lw + g, b(0)) < u(Lw
f + g, b(L)).  The figure clearly 
illustrates how lump-sum payments increase the supply of labor on-farm, which would result in 
greater production. 
  As  further  illustration,  we  provide  a  simple  numerical  example  using  a  plausible 
parametric utility function and plausible income values.  The example is summarized in table 1.  
Let the utility function be of the form u = ln(y) + 0.35s, where y is income from all sources (labor 
on  and  off-farm  plus  lump-sum  payments),  s  is  the  share  of  labor  allocated  to  on-farm 
employment,  and  0.35s  represents  non-pecuniary  benefits  from  on-farm  employment.    We 
choose the parameter 0.35 because it indicates non-pecuniary benefits comprise approximately 
35 percent of utility, which corresponds well with Hamilton (2000), mentioned above and in 
more detail below.  Natural log utility assumes a modest degree of risk aversion:  it is the utility 
function at the limit as the coefficient of relative risk aversion tends to one.  The table considers 
off-farm wage income of $40,000 (column 1), on-farm wage income of $20,000 (column 2), and 
annual lump-sum payments varying from 0 to $50,000 (column 3).  With diminishing marginal 
utility of income and additively-separable non-pecuniary benefits, the assumed utility function 
implies an annual dollar value of non-pecuniary benefits from full-time on-farm employment that 
range from $8,381 to $29,335. The value increases with income because the utility function 
assumes  non-pecuniary  benefits  are  constant  in  utility  ( 0 = yb u ).    In  this  simple  example, 
changing lump-sum payments from $15,000 to $40,000 causes the share of on-farm labor supply 
to increase incrementally from 0 to 1. 
While the result relies on risk aversion, the level of risk aversion necessary to induce 
considerable  supply  response  in  the  example  is  modest—less,  in  fact,  than  that  typically 
estimated in the literature.  More risk aversion would lead to a stronger effect from lump-sum 
payments.  The critical assumption in the example – and in the theory more generally – is that   8 
non-pecuniary  benefits  from  farming  are  economically  significant.    The  rest  of  the  paper 
focuses on an empirical assessment of this key assumption. 
 
 
4. Estimating Nonpecuniary Benefits to Farming 
 
Existing research on the nonpecuniary rewards to farming has focused mainly on differences 
between independent and contract livestock production.  These studies did not compare farm and 
non-farm employment, but contract farming has some similar characteristics to off-farm work. 
Gillespie and Eidman (1998) surveyed hog farmers to elicit utility functions and preferences for 
various contract structures and estimated that farmers had positive nonpecuniary net benefits 
from independent (versus contract) production.  Key (2005) estimated positive nonpecuniary 
benefits  to  independent  production  based  on  the  distribution  of  returns  for  contract  and 
independent hog producers. 
Outside of agriculture, several studies have compared earnings of employees and self-
employed workers (analogous to off-farm and on-farm employment).  Some studies have found 
that the potential wages of entrepreneurs are not significantly different from the wages of paid 
employees (although growth trajectory of their wages differ) (Brock and Evans, 1986; Rees and 
Shah, 1986, Borjas and Bronars, 1989). Hamilton (2000) points out that these studies generally 
suffer  from  two  shortcomings.  First,  mean  earnings  are  strongly  influenced  by  high  income 
entrepreneurial “superstars”, so mean earnings may not characterize the self-employment returns 
of most business owners.  Second, measures of self-employment income used in past studies tend 
to underestimate true entrepreneurial income because individuals had an incentive to underreport 
these  earnings.    Hamilton  addresses  these  shortcomings  and  finds  self-employment  offers 
substantial nonpecuniary benefits for many workers. His comparison of median earnings showed 
that paid employment offers both higher initial earnings and greater earnings growth. After ten   9 
years  in  business,  median  entrepreneurial  earnings  are  35  percent  less  than  the  predicted 
alternative wage for a paid job of the same duration. 
In this study, we estimate the average nonpecuniary benefits for those farm households in 
which  either  the  farm  operator  or  spouse  works  both  on  and  off  the  farm.  This  estimate  is 
unbiased for this sub-sample of farms, which represents more than half of all farms.  However, 
this may not be an unbiased estimate for the entire population because of sample selection bias. 
This issue is addressed in a different study by the authors. 
 
Empirical model 
The difference between average hourly off-farm wage and average hourly return to on-farm 
labor  provides  a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  average  nonpecuniary  benefits  per  hour  from 
farming.  For simplicity, we assume the monetary value of nonpecuniary benefits of farm labor 
increases proportionately with time spent working on-farm:  ( ) l b l b × = .  At the optimum labor 
allocation,  the  marginal  utility  of  one  dollar’s  worth  of  nonpecuniary  benefits  equals  the 
marginal utility from one dollar of income, so  y b u u = .  From (3) it follows that: 
 
(8)      l pq w b - = . 
 
If we use the average on-farm return to labor as an approximation for the value marginal product 
of labor on-farm, then the expected value of the nonpecuniary benefits per hour bi is: 
 
(9)      [ ] [ ]
f
i i i w w E b E - = , 
 
where wi is the off-farm wage and 
f
i w  is the on-farm return to labor per hour (for simplicity, we 
will refer to
f
i w  as the on-farm wage).  For the sample of  o N  farms that provide labor off-farm, 
an unbiased estimate of the nonpecuniary benefits to farming is: 
   10 

















Data for the analysis are from the 2002, 2003, and 2004 Agricultural Resource Management 
Study (ARMS) – the USDA’s primary vehicle for collecting data about the financial conditions 
of  U.S.  farms.
4  ARMS  collects  detailed  information  about  the  farm  business  and  the  farm 
operator household, including income, expenses, debt, assets, land operated, crop production, 
and the allocation of household labor on and off the farm.
5   
Because operator household data are not defined for non-family farms, we consider only 
family  farms  –  farms  that  are  not  operated  by  a  hired  manager  and  that  are  organized  as 
proprietorships, partnerships or family corporations.  Family farms represented approximately 98 
percent of all operations.  
  In 2002, 2003, and 2004, ARMS collected information about the hours of labor worked 
on-farm and off-farm for both the operator and the operator’s spouse, but information is not 
available about on-farm labor time for other family members. Consequently, on-farm labor is 
defined as the total annual hours the principal operator and spouse worked on-farm (paid and 
unpaid) and to be consistent, off-farm labor is defined as the total annual hours the operator and 
spouse  work  off-farm.    The  appendix  describes  in  more  detail  the  construction  of  the  key 
variables using the ARMS data. 
The  on-farm  labor  income  (on-farm  income  attributable  to  farm  household  labor)  is 
defined as the household income from farming minus farmland rental income. Household labor 
income  includes  wages  paid  to  the  operator  and  household  members  by  the  farm  business.  
Farmland rental income is not included in our measure of on-farm labor income because rental 
income is not attributable to farm labor.   On-farm labor income may overestimate returns to 
                                                            
4 Surveys from earlier years were not included because questions about spouse off-farm labor supply were asked in 
only version 1 of the survey – a small subset of the total survey sample.   
5 For more information about ARMS see http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ARMS/.   11 
farm  labor  (and  hence  underestimate  nonpecuniary  benefits)  because  farm  business  income 
includes government payments, which to some degree are decoupled from production and do not 
depend on farm labor.  We explore this in more detail in the next section. 
To some degree our measure of farm labor income is biased upward. ARMS uses an 
accounting-based measure of income that captures net cash flow minus reported depreciation.  
The  income  measure  therefore  includes  returns  to  owned  land  and  capital  used  on-farm,  in 
addition  to  labor.
6    As  a  result,  we  overestimate  the  implicit  on-farm  wage  and  therefore 
underestimate  the  non-pecuniary  benefits  to  farming.    An  alternative  measure  of  farm  labor 
income could be obtained by subtracting an estimate of the opportunity  costs of the owned 
capital  and  land  used  on-farm,  but  this  would  introduce  a  new  set  of  assumptions  (see  for 
example Mishra and Morehart, 2001).  For the purpose of this paper, we prefer to report a 
conservative estimate of nonpecuniary benefits. 
Off-farm labor income is defined as all off-farm income attributable to off-farm work 
(including off-farm wages, salaries, and off-farm business income).  Off-farm labor income does 
not include components of off-farm income not attributable to labor, such as interest, dividends, 
capital gains, social security, and public assistance.   
Because the measures of on-farm  and off-farm  labor income include wages from all 
household members, these measures overestimate returns to operator and spouse labor.  We can 
investigate the extent of the overestimate using data from the 2001 survey because in that year it 
is possible to distinguish the contributions to off-farm labor income by the operator, spouse, and 
other family members.  Of the total average household off-farm income of $33,626, operators 
earned $20,644 (61%), spouses earned $11,924 (35%), and other family members earned $1,058 
(3%). Hence, the contribution of other family members to household off-farm wages is small. If 
other family members contributed nothing to on-farm wages, this would only minimally bias our 
estimate of nonpecuniary benefits upward. On the other hand, if other family members contribute 
more to on-farm wages than off-farm wages, this would have the effect of biasing our estimate of 
                                                            
6 Income from renting out owned land or capital is not included in our measure of income.    12 
nonpecuniary benefits down.   In the next section, we separately consider the sub-sample of 
households with only two members (table 3) and show that the results do not differ substantially 
from the full sample. 
Table 2 summarizes the key labor, income, and wage variables used in the study for each 
of the three survey years.  In general, the median income and wage estimates were more stable 
over time than the mean values.  The average on-farm labor income was substantially higher in 
2004  compared  to  2002  or  2003.  Despite  this,  both  the  average  and  median  nonpecuniary 
benefits  were  only  slightly  lower  in  2004  compared  to  2002.    Estimates  of  the  median 
nonpecuniary benefits (for those farms where the operator or spouse worked off-farm) were 
stable across the three surveys – varying from $21.08 to $24.85 per hour.  
There were 51,429 total observations for the three years of data.  Limiting the sample to 
those households where the operator or spouse worked on farm resulted in 51,396 farms.  Of 
these, 40,177 respondents provided information on how much they worked on-farm (they did not 
refuse  to  provide  this  information).    Dropping  observations  located  in  regions  with  missing 
information on county wages or land quality reduced the total sample to 39,899.  Of these, there 
were 22,388 households where either the operator or spouse worked off-farm and 17,511 where 
the operator and spouse worked only on-farm. 
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 reports the mean and median on-farm and off-farm hourly wages and nonpecuniary 
benefits (the difference  between on-  and off-farm wages) for farm households in which the 
operator or spouse worked off-farm. The table also reports a t-test against the null hypothesis that 
the  difference  between  on-farm  and  off-farm  hourly  wages  is  zero.    The  estimates  of 
nonpecuniary benefits from farming are unbiased for the subset of farm households where the 
operator or spouse works off-farm.    13 
Statistics in the first row in the table are for all farm households in the sample where the 
operator or spouse worked off-farm – a group that represents about 56 percent of all farms and 
which produces about 32 percent of the total value of agricultural production.  Results indicate 
that for those farms where either the operator or spouse works off-farm, households receive a 
median value of $24.00 per hour in nonpecuniary benefits from farming.  For comparison to our 
hypothetical  example  above  (table  1),  this  amounts  to  a  full-time  annual  (2000  hours)  non-
pecuniary benefit of about $48,000. 
To  explore  the  robustness  of  the  results,  table  3  reports  the  estimated  nonpecuniary 
benefits for several sub-samples. The second row excludes households in the top and bottom 1 
percent of on-farm and off-farm wages.  This limits the sample to households earning between 
negative  $105.58  (financial  losses)  and  $207.20  per  hour  on-farm,  and  between  $1.68  and 
$360.95 per hour off-farm.  Row 3 removes the wage outliers and farms where the operator and 
spouse spent less than 480 hours working on-farm and 480 hours off-farm. Row 4 removes the 
wage outliers and farms with operators over 64 years old. Row 5 excludes wage outliers and 
farms with more than two members.  For all five samples the median nonpecuniary benefits are 
very consistent – with a value between $22.39 and $24.37 per hour. 
Rows 6 and 7 in table 3 limit the sample by farm size.  Row 6 removes the wage outliers 
and farms with a total value of production less than $100,000. Row 7 removes the wage outliers 
and farms with production worth less than $250,000.  Not surprisingly, the larger farms are more 
profitable on average, so have a higher on-farm hourly wage.  Because, the off-farm hourly wage 
is about the same for the larger farms, the mean and median nonpecuniary benefits per hour are 
smaller.  However,  even  for  farms  with  a  value  of  production  of  at  least  $250,000,  the 
nonpecuniary benefits were substantial: with a mean value of $6.81 per hour and a median of 
$5.38 per hour.   
Because we are primarily interested in the supply response to government payments, it is 
useful to examine the nonpecuniary benefits of those farm households receiving payments. Table 
4 continues the analysis of table 3 for households with different levels of payments. The samples   14 
exclude on-farm and off-farm wage outliers as before.  The top half of the table shows that mean 
and median nonpecuniary benefits declines as the level of payments increases.  Farms receiving 
more payments earn higher on-farm wages when payments are included in wages, resulting in 
smaller nonpecuniary benefits.  Average nonpecuniary benefits are substantial for all payment 
groups except the largest (more than $50,000 of payments per year). For that group there is no 
statistically significant difference between on-farm and off-farm wages.  
As mentioned in the previous section, when government payments are included in on-
farm  wages,  we  underestimate  the  true  nonpecuniary  benefits.    Some  of  the  government 
payments received in 2002–2004 are lump-sum or “decoupled” – that is, tied to farmland and not 
dependent on the quantity of on-farm labor, and should not be included in on-farm wages.  The 
bottom of table 4 reports the same statistics with government payments deleted from on-farm 
wages. When payments are not included in on-farm wages, differences between on and off-farm 
wages are substantial and statistically significant, and there is no obvious relationship between 
nonpecuniary benefits and the level of payments.  This result suggests substantial nonpecuniary 
benefits  for  farms  receiving  payments  in  of  all  size  categories.    However,  by  not  including 
payments we may overestimate nonpecuniary benefits to the extent that payments depend on on-
farm labor, so the results in the bottom of table 4 can be viewed as an upper bound. 
Finally, it is worth discussing the reliability of the information we are using to compare 
farm and off-farm income. First, our estimates of nonpecuniary benefits would be biased upward 
to the extent that the farmers underreported on-farm income. While there could be an incentive 
for households to underreport sales and over-report costs for tax purposes, it is not clear whether 
there  is  also  an  incentive  to  underreport  on-farm  income  to  USDA  survey  enumerators. 
However, even with a substantial degree of underreporting, the reported average on-farm income 
is  so  low  that  the  nonpecuniary  benefits  likely  remain  large  even  after  accounting  for  the 
underreporting.
7   Second, as discussed above, our measure of the on-farm wage includes returns 
                                                            
7 For example, if the actual sales were 25 percent higher than reported, then the average on-farm income would 
equal $9.28 per hour (compared to $0.57 per hour reported). This higher on-farm income per hour implies 
nonpecuniary benefits of $20.71 per hour (compared to $29.51).   15 
to land and capital, which biases our estimates of nonpecuniary benefits downward.  Third, there 
may be costs associated with working off-farm, including transportation costs, the opportunity 
cost of time spent commuting, and away-from-home meal expenses.  Factoring in these costs 
would reduce the effective off-farm wage, and therefore also nonpecuniary benefits. On the other 
hand, there could be substantial non-wage benefits to off-farm work, including retirement and 
health insurance benefits, and paid vacation and sick time.  Accounting for these benefits would 
raise the effective off-farm wage and nonpecuniary benefits.  Unfortunately, our data do not 





We used farm household data to compare the difference between returns to operator and spouse 
labor  on-farm  and  off-farm.  The  average  difference  between  on-farm  and  off-farm  wages 
provided an estimate of the nonpecuniary benefits to farming for the sub-sample of farms where 
the operator or spouse works off-farm. The empirical results indicate substantial nonpecuniary 
benefits to farming for this sub-sample. 
Using a general theoretical model, we showed that lump-sum payments increase farm 
labor supply under two key assumptions:  (1) farmers prefer working on-farm to off-farm given 
the same wage and (2) declining marginal utility of income.  Our finding that the non-pecuniary 
benefits from farming are large provides empirical support for the first assumption.  The second 
assumption,  though  not  empirically  examined  here,  is  plausible  and  generally  supported  by 
experimental evidence. For large commodity-crop farmers, payments might be large enough to 
have a significant influence on the marginal utility of the dollar, and consequently potentially 
substantial production effects.  The income effect we model does not rely, as other studies, on 
other market imperfections or on changes in the third derivative of the utility function - which 
are probably small.   16 
While  the  theoretical  question  of  how  lump-sum  payments  influence  supply  remains 
unresolved, some recent research has sought to econometrically estimate the link between post-
FAIR Act payments and production. Though these payments may not be truly lump-sum and the 
econometric estimations might be confounded by non-payment factors, the studies generally find 
a positive association between these mostly “decoupled” payments and production (Adams, et. 
al, 2001; Goodwin and Mishra, 2005; Goodwin and Mishra, 2006), and sometimes the link is 
strong  (Key,  Roberts,  and  Lubowski,  2005).
8    This  paper  provides  a  theory  and  supporting 
empirical evidence that could help explain the findings of a strong link between participation in 
largely “decoupled” agricultural programs and production as well as the somewhat puzzling 
result that PFC payments under the 1996 FAIR Act are not entirely capitalized into rents and 
land values (Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins, 2003; Kirwan, 2005).   While this paper focused on 
the production effects of lump-sum payments, “coupled” payments that are tied to production or 
prices would also raise household income, so with nonpecuniary benefits to farming we would 
expect a similar income effect for coupled payments as the one considered in this paper. 
                                                            
8 These payments may not be truly lump-sum because restrictions under the FAIR Act preclude plantings of 
vegetable or conversion of land to nonagricultural uses.  In addition, under the 2002 Farm Act, farmers were 
permitted to update their base acres in a way that depended on their 1997-2002 plantings.  This meant that planting 
decisions after the 1996 Act ultimately influenced payment levels after 2002.     17 
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Notes:    Income  from  full-time  off-farm  employment  is  Lw,  equal  the  total  labor  allocation  (L) 
multiplied by the off-farm wage (w).  Income from full-time on-farm employment is Lw
f, where w
f is 
the implicit on-farm wage. The lower utility line shows diminishing marginal utility of income 
without non-pecuniary benefits of farm labor.  The higher utility line shows additional utility (non-
pecuniary benefits) from farm labor (b(L)) relative to non-farm labor (b(0)).  Without the lump-sum 
transfer (g), utility is higher for working off farm, u(Lw, b(0)) > u(Lw
f, b(L)).  With a lump transfer, 
utility is higher for working on farm, u(Lw + g, b(0)) < u(Lw
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40,000  20,000  0  0.35  10.60  10.25  8,381  0 
40,000  20,000  5,000  0.35  10.71  10.48  10,477  0 
40,000  20,000  10,000  0.35  10.82  10.66  12,572  0 
40,000  20,000  15,000  0.35  10.92  10.81  14,667  0 
40,000  20,000  20,000  0.35  11.00  10.95  16,763  0.14 
40,000  20,000  25,000  0.35  11.08  11.06  18,858  0.39 
40,000  20,000  30,000  0.35  11.16  11.17  20,953  0.64 
40,000  20,000  35,000  0.35  11.23  11.27  23,049  0.89 
40,000  20,000  40,000  0.35  11.29  11.35  25,144  1 
40,000  20,000  45,000  0.35  11.35  11.43  27,239  1 
40,000  20,000  50,000  0.35  11.41  11.51  29,335  1 
 
Notes:  In this hypothetical example, utility has a functional form ln(y) + 0.35s, where y is income from 
all sources, s is the share of labor allocated to on-farm employment, and 0.35s represents non-pecuniary 
benefits from on-farm employment.  Columns 5 and 6 compare utility of working full-time off-farm and 
working full-time on-farm; the boldface values indicate which is highest.  With diminishing marginal 
utility  of  income  and  additively-separable  non-pecuniary  benefits,  the  dollar  value  of  non-pecuniary 
benefits increases with income (column 7).  The optimal allocation of labor on-farm is given in column 8.  
When this share does not equal 0 or 1, it yields utility slightly greater than that the levels reported in 
columns 5 or 6. 
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Table 2. Labor Supply and Income by Year 
    Mean        Median   
    2002  2003  2004    2002  2003  2004 
On-farm hours (operator)  1,370.22  1,416.17  1,720.00     1050  1113  1495 
On-farm hours (spouse)  264.45  326.44  353.14    0  0  0 
On-farm hours (operator and spouse)  1,634.66  1,742.61  2,073.14    1250  1300  1690 
On-farm labor income  3,533.86  7,235.07  25,027.65    -2,453.91  -2,076.87  850 
On-farm  hourly wage  1.57  2.84  12.55    -2.7  -2.11  0.84 
Off-farm hours (operator)
1  1,458.42  1,506.78  1,324.89    2000  2000  1785 
Off-farm hours (spouse)
 1  1,141.07  1,178.86  1,256.16    1400  1440  1560 
Off-farm hours (operator and spouse)
 1  2,599.48  2,685.64  2,581.05    2340  2340  2250 
Off-farm labor income (earned)
 1  68,289.65  67,845.34  72,263.94    47,251.25  49,683.78  53,750.00 
Off-farm hourly wage (op. and sp.)
 1  49.28  33.59  54.53    19.63  19.17  20.27 
Nonpecuniary benefit per hour
1  51.23  34.02  45.78    24.85  23.8  21.08 
               
Observations  11,495  16,805  11,599         
Observations
1  6,478  9,304  6,606            
Note: The nonpecuniary benefit per hour is defined as the off-farm wage per hour minus the on-farm wage per hour. 
1 These statistics are for operations where the operator or spouse works off-farm.  22 
Table 3. Nonpecuniary Benefits per Hour for Various Samples 
 

















1) All farms where operator or spouse works 
some time off-farm  22,388  0.06  43.30  43.25  24.00  -7.11*** 
2) Exclude hourly wage outliers  21,222  -1.59  28.37  29.96  23.89  -103.79*** 
3) Exclude hourly wage outliers and farms 
where spouse and operator works less than 
480 hours off-farm and less than 480 hours 
on-farm  17,886  -1.14  25.70  26.84  22.39  -103.85*** 
4) Exclude hourly wage outliers and farms 
with operators 65 years and older  19,154  -1.58  27.78  29.36  24.01  -99.37*** 
5) Exclude hourly wage outliers and 





6) Exclude hourly wage outliers and farms 
producing less than $100,000 of output  10,243  15.76  28.45  12.69  9.26  -25.07*** 
7) Exclude hourly wage outliers and farms 
producing less than $250,000 of output  6,358  21.98  28.79  6.81  5.38  -9.88*** 
 
Notes: *** indicates paired t-statistics have a p-value < 0.0001.  The paired t statistic associated with the test of the null hypothesis that the 
paired difference (di = off-farm wagei - on-farm wagei) is zero is defined:   ( ) n s d t d = , where  d  is the sample mean of the paired 
differences,  d s  is the sample variance of the paired differences, and n is sample size.  
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Table 4. Nonpecuniary Benefits per Hour by Government Payments Category 
 

















Government payments included in on-farm 
income             
     1) Government payments > 0  13,454  4.05  26.78  22.73  18.65  -60.31*** 
     2) Government payments ³ 10,000  7,495  15.32  27.17  11.85  9.43  -20.58*** 
     3) Government payments ³ 25,000  4,378  22.51  28.19  5.68  5.88  -7.16*** 
     4) Government payments ³ 50,000  1,996  30.35  31.23  0.88  0.08     -0.66 
Government payments not included in on-
farm income             
     5) Government payments > 0  13,454  -5.22  26.78  32.00  23.37  -73.81*** 
     6) Government payments ³ 10,000  7,495  -1.81  27.17  28.99  19.72  -40.73*** 
     7) Government payments ³ 25,000  4,378  0.60  28.19  27.58  21.71  -32.37*** 
     8) Government payments ³ 50,000  1,996  -2.58  31.23  33.81  26.44  -22.37*** 
 
Notes: Sample includes farms where operator or spouse works some time off-farm and excludes on-farm and off-farm wage outliers. 
*** indicates paired t-statistics have a p-value < 0.0001.  The paired t statistic associated with the test of the null hypothesis that the paired 
difference (di = off-farm wagei - on-farm wagei) is zero is defined:   ( ) n s d t d = , where d  is the sample mean of the paired differences, 
d s  is the sample variance of the paired differences, and n is sample size.    24 
Appendix: Definition and Construction of Key Variables Using ARMS Data 
 
Variables in ITALICS are taken directly from the ARMS survey data (not constructed by the 
authors).  Variable in bold are constructed using the ARMS data. The following documents the 
variables used in this study using the 2004 ARMS survey. There are a few differences in variable 
names in the 2002 and 2003 ARMS surveys that are not shown.  Further documentation for 
ARMS variables and surveys are available at: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ARMS/GlobalDocumentation.htm .  
 
Off-farm labor income = EARNED (income from off-farm work) where: 
 
EARNED = OFFBUSI + ADJWAGE (off-farm business income + off-farm wages) 
 
ADJWAGE = A950 + A951 + A952 (off-farm wages + salaries + other earnings) 
 
Note: annual off-farm wage does not include interest and dividends, off-farm capital gains, social 
security and public assistance, or other off-farm income. 
 
On-farm labor income = FARMHHI – FARMRENT (household income from farming – income 
from farmland rental) 
 
FARMHHI = FARMBHH + FARMRENT + OTFBUSI + OPPD + SPPD + HMPD (farm business 
income to household + income from farmland rental + other farm business income + wage paid to 
operator for farm work + wage paid to spouse for farm work + wage paid to other household 
members for farm work) 
 
FARMBHH = (FARMBUSI) * (FOHHPER/100)  (farm business income * percent of farm income 
received by household) 
 
FARMBUSI = INCFI – ENDEPR – V13A – OPPD (net cash farm income - depreciation expense 
– income from land rented to others – income paid to operator) 
 
INCFI = V16 - V41 (gross cash farm income – total cash operating expenses) 
 
V16 = V3A + V15 (livestock and crop income plus net CCC loans + total other farm income, 
including government payments) 
 
Off-farm hours worked = R933*R935 + R934*R936 (annual hours operator worked off-farm + 
annual hours operator’s spouse worked off-farm) 
 
R933*R935 = operator’s weeks of off-farm work per year * hours of off-farm work per week  
R934*R936 = spouse’s weeks of off-farm work per year * hours of off-farm work per week  
 
On-farm hours worked = OPHRS + SPHRS (annual hours operator worked on-farm + annual 
hours operator’s spouse worked on-farm)  
 
Off-farm hourly wage = off-farm labor income/off-farm hours worked 
 
On-farm hourly wage = on-farm labor income/on-farm hours worked 